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14 June 1964

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Memo For: C/OS/TR

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Subject : Conference [] 12 June 1964

1. The entire undertaking was a high success as far as I was personally concerned. The major pre-occupation was trying to take advan-

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2. We did finally get around to the business at hand at 1030, Friday morning. Attending the conference were:

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The conference lasted about one hour. The only discordant note was [] who continually interjected himself into the discussions, but who was so far out in left field that I wondered if he had the slightest idea about the whole subject of Counterinsurgency, much less the purpose of the meeting.

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3. It was my impression that under the present curriculum, Counterinsurgency (Internal Defense) is being adequately covered and that we are complying with NSM 283 as far as the JOT's are concerned. The crux of the problem is to slightly shift the emphasis or actually identify those items in the curriculum which are concerned with C-I.

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4. Although [] said that he had as much as 18 hours "to play with," I believe it was the consensus that with the shift of emphasis as well as certain other minor additions, the necessary additions could be made. This is my understanding of the action:

a. HT: Essentially unaffected. We set the stage, discuss the big picture, cover the C-I effort at the National level and the overall responsibilities of Headquarters. This has and will continue to be done in Paul [] two-hour presentation. I might try to work something in on the NSM's per se, like I am in the CSR.

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b. SIC: [] will beef up his end of the program. This will include a study of the countries on the "Critical List" as well as detailed coverage of several countries which will then be picked up by the OC as the environment for a couple of problems which will be directed toward the Field implementation of C-I directives. [] will also swing a portion of his program over to the basic causes and effects of insurgency, particularly subversive insurgency.

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c. [] was designated as action officer to beef up the program at that end. He will study the present curriculum, make recommendations for the shift of emphasis and identification of other material which can be related to C-I. He will be the point of contact [] Hq; seeing that SIC and HT coverage dovetail []

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I will put him in touch with [] to see that he has a direct line and stays current.

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It will be the main job of [] to cover the Field implementation of Hq directives as well as the Agency responsibility in the C-I field. There was some indication of studying three divergent areas or case studies which could show the "three phases" of C-I. It was almost unanimous to try to play down the overemphasis on Vietnam and give more attention to the "preventive phase." I gave [] a copy of the four most pertinent Book Dispatches, and indicated that I felt that the students should be required to work on [] to the IDP. []

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I also brought the [] Now I can see the reason for the [] remarks. It was decided that this is not too "high level" for the JOT's. [] will try to make this into a reading paper and get [] or someone else to take it from there with specific examples

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5. All-in-all a most productive and enjoyable visit. Believe that everyone is on the same wave length, with one exception. [] and the rest of us believe that we can satisfy both the DTR and DDTR that C-I is receiving the proper and adequate coverage required.

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P.S. Previously I showed the [] who had much of the same opinion as the group at [] he did not feel that it was necessary or appropriate for the CIPP or its successor.

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